

the section "Navies at Peace" looks at the U.S. naval mission to Peru during the 1920s, unionization in the Dutch Navy, and British diplomatic efforts at the Washington Conference to neuter the submarine. Another section examines navies in quasi-war situations with essays on clandestine U-boat operations in the Spanish Civil War, the Vichy flotilla based at Martinique, and the roots of American naval commitments to the Persian Gulf area.

Operational history receives its share of attention with papers on the deployments of the British and French fleets during the months prior to Yorktown, the key role played in the First Balkan War by smaller navies, and the value of convoys to the Axis powers. The three papers on joint and amphibious operations analyze the abortive American-French attempt to seize Newport in 1778, German chances for success with Operation Sealion, and Allied difficulties in planning for Torch.

Naval technology provides the theme for several papers; one assesses the impact of mine warfare in the opening months of Operation Barbarossa, a second traces the influence of the "Gun Club" admiral William Blandy on early initiatives by the U.S. Navy in nuclear weaponry and guided missiles, and a third compares naval-industrial relations in Wilhelmine Germany and in the United States during the 1920s. A tightly-knit session at the Symposium entitled "The Small Wars Heritage of the United States Marine Corps" yielded a thoughtful commentary and three fine papers: one on leadership problems in the Samar campaign during 1901-2, a second on efforts by the Corps against insurgents in Hispaniola from 1915 to 1924, and the last on the effectiveness of the controversial Combined Action Program in South Vietnam.

The overall quality of these essays is high, and virtually all treat neglected areas of the field. There is something here for any scholar of the military past. Roberts and Sweetman deserve praise for their careful work.

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Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy.

By Robert L. O'Connell. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991. Photographs. Tables. Notes. Index. Pp. xiv, 409. \$24.95.

Robert O'Connell, Senior Analyst at the U.S. Army Intelligence Agency's Foreign Service and Technology Center and author of the provocative study *Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons, and Aggression* (1989), has produced an entertaining and bold interpretation of the American Navy's half-century-long romance with the battleship. O'Connell argues that the Mahanian battleships came to dominate American defense doctrine in the 1890s because they satisfied the Progressive notion of success by organizing the overwhelming technology of massive machines. He then traces the evolution of battleships as icons sacred to nearly all naval leaders. He notes that defying "pure logic" (p. 4), "their sound and

fury signified very little in terms of destructive powers" (p. xiii) and blinded strategy makers to the significance of emerging military technologies, especially submarines and airplanes.

The argument lost this reader more than once, sometimes by skipping decades in a single sentence (e.g., pp. 48, 80), or by mixing similes or metaphors (e.g., pp. 135-39, 185; 236). Too often O'Connell makes his arguments merely with metaphors for illustration, finally concluding that battleships are "nautical vampires, rising over and over to drink deeply at the public trough" (p. 319).

For support, O'Connell resuscitates contemporary arguments against the battleship orthodoxy. Extracted mainly from navalist correspondence and antinavalist polemics, the overstated argument claims that "the vaunted battleship was in fact never an effective weapon." It misrepresents their vulnerability, for instance, by showing the flaws of battle-cruisers at Jutland. It confuses the need for foresight with that for strategic planning; at one point it blames war-gaming's two-dimensional nature for failing to integrate submarine and aerial warfare into the 1893 strategy—years before these technologies demonstrated practicable military applications. The argument appears to overlook planners' needs to create a working strategy. O'Connell is best in analyzing the impact of early key navalists such as Alfred Mahan and William Sims, but even here he might have benefitted from recent scholarship; his citations, which are extensive, include surprisingly few works written in the last two decades. Fortunately, O'Connell's over-stated argument still has an appealing ring of truth. His well-told battle accounts quite consistently support the argument that navalists learned with dangerous selectivity from wartime experiences.

Sacred Vessels, derived from a master's thesis and then a 1974 Ph.D. dissertation, is an uneven work with a surprising number of errors of typography and citation. However, it is lively and entertaining and should sell widely, contributing usefully to the discussion about the nature of military appropriations and strategy. With these caveats, I recommend this book to all historians interested in this debate.

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Mark Russell Shulman

Dive into History Volume 2: U.S. Submarines. By Henry C. Keatts and George C. Farr. Houston: Gulf Publishing Company, 1991. Illustrations. Maps. Bibliography. Index. Pp. vii, 211. \$18.95.

As its title literally states, this slightly off-beat but entertaining and solidly researched book is written primarily for experienced and skilled wreck divers. Twelve hulks of U.S. Navy submarines sunk in relatively shallow U.S. coastal waters and which can be visited by divers are discussed and illustrated with excellent underwater color photographs. The hulks range from the *G-1*, Simon Lake's first submarine for the U.S. Navy,