

lation he was unable to derail. Edson abruptly retired. Despite his sterling combat record and invaluable efforts during the unification battles, he received neither retirement ceremony nor parade; instead, he retired with a substandard fitness report. In the remaining years before his death in 1955, Edson served as Vermont's first Commissioner of Public Safety and, beginning in June 1951, was the executive director of the National Rifle Association.

Some readers might wish for more clarity in the author's essay on sources; it is not always easy to discern the sources of many of the quotations used. However, most readers probably won't care. Overall, *Once a Legend* is an objective look at a truly legendary Marine; a study made invaluable by the author's close and honest examination of Edson's strengths and faults—and there were several of each. For the general reader looking for a good story, and for the military professional searching for significant lessons, this is a book not to be missed.

Lieutenant Colonel Solis, a former tracked vehicle officer and judge advocate, is the author of *Marines and Military Law in Vietnam: Trial By Fire* (U.S. Marine Corps History & Museums Division, 1989). He currently teaches law at the London School of Economics.

War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century

Alvin and Heidi Toffler. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993. 252 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. \$22.95 (\$20.66).

Reviewed by Mark R. Shulman

Although it hardly can be called a science, the study of trends for the purpose of predicting the future has made some progress since the days of Jules Verne and even George Orwell. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, perhaps the best-known futurists, have written earlier books on the impact of technological advances upon societies—*Future Shock* (Random House, 1970), *The Third Wave* (William Morrow, 1980), and *Powershift* (Bantam Books, 1990). Now, with *War and Anti-War*, they turn their attention to the evolution of warfare in the next century.

First, the authors bring the uninitiated up to speed by summarizing their thoughts on the "waves" of civilization presented in their earlier works. The First Wave comprised premodern or agricultural society, wherever and whenever it existed or now exists. The Second Wave created the modern societies of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. The Third Wave, only now materializing, is characterized by postmodern values as much as by informational technologies of untold power. Not surpris-

ingly, the Tofflers see a world on the cusp of dramatic change—as microcomputers, robots, and advanced communications networks reshape the world as dramatically as the hoe and the internal-combustion engine did before them. Nevertheless, as during the First and Second Waves, development occurs unevenly in the world. The Third Wave is sweeping through North America, Western Europe and Japan, but has bypassed much of the First- and Second-Wave world.

Moreover, the Tofflers observe, as with the previous Waves, the Third Wave has its own distinctive way of war. Pre-modern societies fight with only rudimentary machines; a hallmark of modern warfare is the massing and maneuvering of gigantic formations of aircraft, armored vehicles, warships, and personnel. On land, postmodern civilizations use relatively small units of highly trained soldiers. They are guided to their targets by satellite navigation systems; they fire laser-guided weapons; and they use lightning-fast infiltration and exfiltration techniques. Third Wave naval combat features cruisers and destroyers equipped with the Aegis combat system, which can track and destroy dozens of targets simultaneously with guided missiles while firing cruise missiles at targets hundreds of miles away. Such ships have shattered conventional notions about limitations on warships' power and accuracy.

According to the Tofflers, the Persian Gulf War was actually two wars. There was a Second-Wave war in which the U.S.-led Coalition's armor, artillery, and infantry—backed by 30-year old bombers and World War II-era *Iowa* (BB-61)-class battleships—fought Iraq's armor, artillery, and infantry. There also was a Third-Wave war in which stealth and other advanced technologies were used in a campaign of customized destruction. Fortunately, the United States and its allies were capable of winning both wars.

In the technological respect, at least, the Tofflers improve on Jules Verne by bringing together a number of plausible situations. They predict that the Third-Wave military technology used in the Persian Gulf is only the beginning. For example, soon there will be ant-sized robots that will be able to infiltrate an enemy's defenses, nausea-stimulating broadcasts, and teflon-like sprays that will render airstrips inoperable. Unfortunately, these fantastic weapons and others like them will not be ours alone, for proliferation is bringing the newest in warfighting technology to renegade states, drug cartels, and Islamist terrorists.

The authors have not, however, improved on George Orwell, the outstanding futurologist of politics. They gener-

ally limit their predictions to technological change. Although they allude to the relative decline of a nation-state system, they do not take this theme very far. The Tofflers' political analysis rarely extends beyond the not-so-astounding prediction that the brave new world will be populated by a number of "Husseins."

Echoing Sun Tzu, the authors point out the importance of avoiding war and offer a solution: "anti-war." In the future, peace will not be gained and maintained by the expansion of democracy, the increase of wealth, or the use of active diplomacy. Instead, the world will avoid wars only if concerted use is made of anti-war technology—e.g., gasses that will make drug lords too groggy to fight, paint that will weaken bridges, and "clipper chips" that will immobilize aircraft in time of war.

This book has its defects. It contains more typographical errors than a responsible editor should have allowed. Nearly every page has an annoying and frequently irrelevant subtitle—e.g., "The Duck Soup Phenomenon," "Laughing in the Info-Sphere," and "Six Wrenches that Twist the Mind." Finally, the research appears too often limited to reports from *Defense News* or interviews with military officials in charge of technological forecasting. Name-dropping frequently substitutes for data. As such, *War and Anti-War* often seems less serious critical commentary and more propaganda for huge research-and-development budgets.

Like most books about the extremely broad topic of world war, politics, and economics in the future, *War and Anti-War* comes up short in many areas. Paul Kennedy's *Preparing for the Twenty-first Century* (Random House, 1993) provides a more interesting analysis of political, demographic, and economic change. Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilization," which appeared in the Summer 1993 *Foreign Affairs* and Daniel Patrick Moynihan's *Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics* (Oxford University Press, 1993) provide more useful examinations of intercultural conflict. And Martin van Creveld's *The Transformation of War* (Free Press, 1991) offers more penetrating examinations of trends in warfare. However, none of these authors offer such a vivid portrayal of the growing gap in technological capability between the developed and the developing worlds as the Tofflers do. Thus, even with its shortcomings, this book provides a provocative look into the future.

Dr. Shulman taught military history at Yale for several years before joining the National Strategy Information Center in Washington, D.C. this year. His book *Navalism: Politics and the Emergence of U.S. Naval Strategy* is forthcoming from the Naval Institute Press.

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